Understand how systems fail.
Control operational risk.
Qualitative and quantitative FMECA per IEC 60812 and MIL-STD-1629A. Functional failure decomposition, consequence classification, criticality (Cm, Cr), detection coverage, and auditable corrective-action closure - for rotating, electrical, and process assets.
Built for Reliability Engineers · Asset Integrity · Maintenance Strategy · Plant Managers
A reliability engineering workflow, not a scoring calculator.
Faithful to IEC 60812 - functional failures, failure modes, mechanisms, effects, consequences, detection gaps, corrective actions, and residual risk - with full traceability.
Functional failure decomposition
Function → functional failure → failure mode → mechanism → cause. The four-level model RCM and IEC 60812 actually require.
Consequence classification
Severity classes I–IV (Catastrophic / Critical / Marginal / Negligible) per MIL-STD-882, scored across Safety, Environmental, Production, and Cost.
Detection & control coverage
Map each mode to its monitoring technology - vibration, IR, oil, partial discharge, walk-down, none - and surface hidden-failure exposure.
Quantitative criticality
Cₘ = β·α·λₚ·t when failure-rate data exists; qualitative S × O × D RPN when it doesn't. Both, side-by-side, on the same worksheet.
Corrective action closure
Assign, track, and close mitigations. Re-score post-mitigation S/O/D to evidence residual risk reduction - not just promise it.
Auditable & traceable
Every change versioned. Aligned to IEC 60812, MIL-STD-1629A, SAE JA1011/JA1012, ISO 14224, ISO 55001, ISO 31000.
Maintenance strategy is a decision, not a number.
Each failure mode is routed through an RCM-aligned decision flow. Strategy is derived from consequence and detectability - not from a single priority score.
Evident failure?
├─ No → Failure-Finding task (FF) at calculated FFI
└─ Yes → Safety / Environmental consequence?
├─ Yes → Mandatory task - CBM / TBM / Redesign
└─ No → Operational consequence?
├─ Yes → Cost-justified CBM / TBM
└─ No → Run-to-Failure (RTF), monitoredEngineering-grade methodology
The FMECA discipline your reliability engineers already trust - IEC 60812 workflow, consequence classification, and quantitative criticality where the data supports it.
- Decomposition
- Function → Functional Failure → Failure Mode → Mechanism → Cause
- Severity (S)
- MIL-STD-882 classes I–IV scored across Safety / Environmental / Production / Cost
- Occurrence (O)
- ISO 14224 taxonomy + site failure history (λp)
- Detection (D)
- Scored by monitoring technology and P-F interval coverage
- Hidden failures
- Routed through Failure-Finding Interval (FFI) logic
- Residual risk
- Post-mitigation S/O/D recorded and trended to evidence reduction
Criticality model
Cₘ = β · α · λₚ · t
β = conditional probability of failure effect · α = failure mode ratio · λp = part failure rate · t = exposure time
RPN = S × O × D (1 – 1000)
Used when validated failure-rate data is unavailable. Re-scored post-mitigation to demonstrate residual risk reduction.
Why not a spreadsheet?
The honest competitor isn't another SaaS - it's a macro-enabled workbook in a SharePoint folder. Here's what changes.
| Capability | Spreadsheet FMECA | Generic SaaS | FMECA Engine |
|---|---|---|---|
| ISO 14224 taxonomy enforcement | no | partial | yes |
| Functional decomposition (4 levels) | no | no | yes |
| Consequence classification (S/E/P/C) | manual | no | yes |
| Quantitative Cₘ + qualitative RPN | one or the other | RPN only | both |
| Hidden-failure / FFI logic | no | no | yes |
| Residual risk evidence | no | partial | yes |
| Versioned audit trail (ISO 55001) | no | partial | yes |
| Multi-asset rollup to boardroom | no | no | yes |
- IEC 60812:2018FMEA / FMECA procedure
- MIL-STD-1629AProcedures for performing a FMECA
- MIL-STD-882ESeverity classes I–IV
- SAE JA1011 / JA1012RCM evaluation criteria & guide
- ISO 14224:2016Reliability data collection & taxonomy
- ISO 55001:2014Asset management - audit traceability
- ISO 31000Risk management principles